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ABSTRACT
This essay treats a little-known episode of Italian financial history:
the crisis that hit Italy’s Catholic banks during the twenties. Given
the significant number of banks involved (about fifty), the field of
investigation is limited to those of the Veneto region. The study
draws on documents in the Bank of Italy’s Historical Archives and
the Intesa-Sanpaolo Historical Archive. Although it a plausible thesis
that the Fascist regime had a strategy aimed at weakening the sys-
tem of Catholic banks, the causes of the crisis must be sought else-
where. The macroeconomic and institutional context certainly
played an important role, but the archival sources bring out the re-
sponsibility of the men who managed the banks. Seeking to im-
prove business performance and lured by the prospect of easy
earnings, they underestimated the risks involved in industrial invest-
ments, not only as lenders but also as shareholders. Then they cov-
ered up their banks’ real financial situation with accounting tricks
and cross-shareholdings between banks. The latter made things
more complicated for the authorities, whose tardy interventions un-
doubtedly were to the detriment of the depositors’ rights.
1. Banking crises
Banking and financial crises continue to interest historians and
economists. If it is true that the financial crises almost always come
with the fall in stock prices on the heels of speculation or of a col-
lapse of the real economy, banking crises can be considered a sub-
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set of them.1 This is not to say that the two crises may sometimes co-
incide and overlap, especially in bank-oriented countries like Italy.2
In its turn, a banking crisis can manifest itself in various ways: the
failure of a bank or the collapse of several institutions, panic among
savers and a run on deposits, the growth of non-performing loans,
or government measures to support the banks.3 These phenomena
do not necessarily coincide; for instance, banking panics can occur
without a significant increase in bankruptcies, or there can be a spate
of failures without generalized panic.4 Banking crises can have dif-
ferent features depending on the simultaneous presence or absence
of these elements, leading to a distinction between borderline and
systemic crises,5 both of which, however, produce real effects on var-
ious economic actors.6
Moreover, banking crises can be accompanied by an equally
complex and related phenomenon: banking scandals.7 As G. Felloni
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1 For an introduction to the subject of banking and financial crises, see P. Pecorari, “Le
crisi bancarie e finanziarie: un problema storiografico aperto. Introduzione al con-
vegno”, in P. Pecorari (ed.), Crisi e scandali bancari nella storia d’Italia, Venice, 2006, pp.
1-8. For an investigation on the theoretical level and of the different approaches to the
subject, see, on the one hand, the works of C.P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes.
A History of Financial Crises, London, 19781, and H.P. Minsky, Financial Instability: The
Current Dilemma, Washington, 1975, and, on the other, M. Friedman and A.J. Schwartz,
A Monetary History of United States 1867-1960, New York, 1963, A.J. Schwartz, “Real and
Pseudo-financial Crises”, in F.F. Capie and G.E. Wood (eds.), Financial Crises and the
World Banking System, London, 1986, pp. 11-31; P. Cagan, Determinants and Effects of
Changes in The Stock of Money 1875-1960, New York, 1965.
2 P. Cafaro, “Crisi bancarie tra Ottocento e Novecento”, in A. Di Vittorio (ed.), Dalle crisi
alle età della crisi, Turin, 2014, pp. 97-128.
3 Regarding the identification factors of banking crises: C.W. Calomiris and G. Gorton,
“The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation”, in R. Glenn Hub-
bard (ed.), Financial Markets and Financial Crises, Chicago, 1991, pp. 107-173; G. Caprio
and D. Klingebiel, “Bank Insolvencies: Cross Country Experience”, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper no. 1620, 1996.
4 C.W. Calomiris, “Banking Crises Yesterday and Today”, PEW, Financial Reform Pro-
ject, Briefing Paper no. 8, 2009, pp. 2-4.
5 G. Caprio and D. Klingebiel, Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises, Wash-
ington, D.C., 1999; L. Laeven and F. Valencia, “Systemic Banking Crises: A New
Database”, IMF Working Paper no. 224, 2008.
6 L. Carpinelli, “Effetti reali delle crisi bancarie: una rassegna della letteratura”, Banca
d’Italia, Questioni di economia e finanza (Occasional Papers), no. 55, settembre 2009.
7 Pecorari, Le crisi bancarie, p. 6.
points out, these correspond to “une fracture entre l’éthique en
vigueur (implicit dans la législation) et la conduite d’une ou de
quelques agences d’intermédiaires financiers.”8 As far as post-uni-
fication Italy is concerned, the economic historical literature on bank-
ing crises is very extensive, mainly investigating the years up to the
1936 banking law.9 Studies have focused on six major cases that oc-
curred during that period: the crisis of 1865-66, concomitant with
the adoption of forced currency; the 1873 crash; the banking scandals
of the “black years” of the Italian economy; the crisis of 1907; the
bank failures of 1920-21; and the crisis of universal banks in the early
1930s.10
As noted by G. Toniolo, among the little-known episodes of Ital-
ian financial history there is “the long-lasting crisis of Catholic
banks, which reached its peak between the beginning of 1928 and
the end of 1930.”11 This case is “underestimated”, writes G. Conti,
because it is sometimes considered an appendix to the post-war cri-
sis, sometimes the herald of the “Great Depression”, and sometimes
the effect of the protracted crisis of Italy’s large banks, including
Banco di Roma.12 The events are rather well known for their political
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8 G. Felloni, “Crises et scandales bancaires dans la formation du système financier: le
cas italien (1861-1982)”, in G. Felloni, Scritti di storia economica, I, Genoa, 1998, p. 700.
9 During the following period, there were mostly crises and failures of single institu-
tions, which were resolved with interventions managed within the banking system: A.
Armento, F. Belli, R. Bertelli, and A. Brozzetti, “Un ventennio di crisi bancarie in Italia
(1963-1985)”, in F. Belli, G. Minvervini, F. Patroni Griffi, and M. Porzio (eds.), Banche in
crisi. 1960-1985, Rome-Bari, 1987, pp. 59-74.
10 A concise but effective overview is found in Cafaro, Crisi bancarie, op. cit., pp. 113-
121, which basically recalls the episodes of crisis that had been the topic of the ninth
“Luigi Luzzatti Study Day for the History of Contemporary Italy, Crisi e scandali ban-
cari nella storia d’Italia”, promoted by the Veneto Institute of Sciences, Letters and Arts
in September 2004 (Pecorari, ed., Crisi e scandali, op. cit.). Conference papers were de-
livered by, in order, Tommaso Fanfani, Giuseppe Conti, Giovanni Zalin, Salvatore La
Francesca, Alberto Cova and Frediano Bof.
11 G. Toniolo, “Il profilo economico”, in G. Guarino and G. Toniolo (eds.), La Banca d’I-
talia e il sistema bancario. 1919-1936, Rome-Bari, 1993, pp. 58-66.
12 G. Conti, “Strategie di speculazione, di sopravvivenza e frodi bancarie prima della
grande crisi”, in G. Conti, T. Fanfani, S. La Francesca and A. Polsi (eds.), Imprenditori e
banchieri. Formazione e selezione dell’imprenditorialità in Italia dall’Unità ai nostri giorni,
implications,13 and their reconstruction has been used to support the
hypothesis, suggested by G. De Rosa, that the Fascist regime had a
very precise strategy,14 endorsed by an authoritative part of the
Catholic world, aimed at “depopularizing” the Catholic banks,15 i.e.
dismantling their ties with Luigi Sturzo’s Partito Popolare Italiano.16
Analyzed from a purely economic standpoint and considering
the factors it entailed, the case of the Catholic banks can be counted
among the crises and scandals that punctuated Italian history up to
the pax bancaria.17
2. The crisis of Catholic banks: the case of the Veneto “group”
The general features of the case are well known,18 so I will only
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Naples, 2004, pp. 1-54. On the history of Banco di Roma, see L. De Rosa, Storia del Banco
di Roma, II, Rome, 1983.
13 See G. De Rosa, I conservatori nazionali, Brescia, 1962, chap. III; G. Rossini, Le banche
cattoliche durante il periodo fascista (first published in Il Nuovo Osservatore in 1966 and
later in G. Rossini, Il movimento cattolico nel periodo fascista, momenti e problemi, Rome,
1966); A. Caroleo, Le banche cattoliche dalla prima guerra mondiale al fascismo, Milan, 1976.
14 G. De Rosa, Una banca cattolica fra cooperazione e capitalismo. La Banca Cattolica del Veneto,
Rome-Bari, 1990, pp. 119-140.
15 “Catholic” refers here to those institutions (not just economic) that arose in almost
every diocese in the late nineteenth century in the legal form of limited liability coop-
erative societies (the Luzzatti model). They were inspired by the social doctrine of the
Church, participating in the so-called économie charitable, within the organization of
the Opera dei Congressi. When the latter was dissolved, its legacy was passed on to
the Unione Economico-Sociale, which in 1914 gave birth to the Italian Banking Feder-
ation (Federazione Bancaria Italiana). The latter, in turn, established Credito Nazionale,
a sort of central bank of the Catholic banks, linked to Banco di Roma (M. Pessina,
“Prime note sull’organizzazione federativa cattolica del Credito: Federazione bancaria
italiana e Credito nazionale dal 1914 al 1926”, Bollettino dell’Archivio per la storia del
movimento sociale cattolico in Italia, 22, 1987, pp. 288-329).
16 With reference to the links between Catholic banks and the Partito Popolare, Sturzo
himself, responding in December 1930 to Mussolini’s slanderous statements and to the
“tendentious correction” of the Vatican daily Osservatore Romano, wrote: “if Catholic
churches had preserved little of Catholicism, they had achieved less popularism... a lot
of leaders of Catholic banks had ceased to be Catholics, but they were never popolari”
(Rossini, Banche cattoliche, op. cit., pp. 7-21).
17 This refers to the period from the 1936 banking law to the mid-1970s (Cafaro, Crisi
bancarie, op. cit., p. 114).
18 In addition to the previously cited works by Gabriele De Rosa and Gianni Toniolo,
recall its essential aspects, functional to the objectives of this work.
After the failure of Banca Italiana di Sconto and the rescue of Banco
di Roma, the issue of greatest concern for the Government in the
credit field was “the potential failure of the Catholic banks.” These
words were used by Giuseppe Volpi, the outgoing minister of fi-
nance, writing in July 1928 to the Governor of the Bank of Italy,
Bonaldo Stringher, to describe the delicate situation and underscore
the need to “implement a plan of definitive and concrete action.”19
The difficulties of Catholic credit institutions, the contours of which
had had been known since at least 1926, emerged clearly in April
1928, when the results of the investigation conducted by Emilio Pun-
turieri on behalf of the Italian Banking Federation reached Stringher
and Volpi. The situation of 48 Catholic banks examined by the Pun-
turieri can be summarized as follows:
a) over two billion lire of deposits raised largely in rural areas;
b) all assets tied-up; some banks breaking even, others with modest
losses, and others with severely damaged balance sheets;
c) the total loss exceeded half a billion lire and had a minimal effect
on shares held by third parties, with over nine-tenths falling on
depositors, since the majority of each bank was “indirectly
owned by the bank itself”;
d) less than a quarter of the total losses depended “on the adven-
turous and disgraceful operations of Credito Nazionale” and the
rest on “ascertained or presumed shortfalls” of the individual
banks.20
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see M. Pegrari, L’Unione Bancaria Nazionale. Nascita, ascesa e declino di una grande banca
lombarda (1903-1932), Brescia, 2004), pp. 73-90; A.M. Falchero, “Crisi del ‘grande capi-
tale’ e crisi dell’economia italiana da ‘quota ’90’ ai primi anni Trenta”, in V. Castronovo
(ed.), Storia dell’Iri, 1, Dalle origini al dopoguerra, Rome-Bari, 2011, pp. 140-150.
19 ASBI, Direttorio Introna, cart. 29, fasc. 1, sfasc. 1, p. 11, Promemoria Banche cattoliche
inviato da Giuseppe Volpi a Bonaldo Stringher, 7 July 1928. The difficulties besetting
these institutions “constituted the main threat to soundness of the banking system in
the years ranging from the revaluation of the lira to the Great Depression” (Toniolo, Il
profilo economico, op. cit., pp. 58, 65).
20 This was the summary Donato Menichella delivered to Volpi in May 1928. Menichella
was person entrusted by Stringher with managing the reorganization of Catholic banks.
Despite his refusal, Menichella took an interest in the matter by sharing his thoughts
The results of that investigation, which, according to
Menichella,21 Stringher and Volpi, “deliberately” underestimated the
real losses, brought out conduct by the bankers involved that not
only was contrary to the rules of economic ethics underpinning the
new legislation, but, above all, posed a threat to the national savings,
whose protection “was in all respects a priority objective of fas-
cism.”22 What were the possible solutions?
The Federation intended to create a central credit institution,
managed by “the Federation’s men”, but with the financial support
of the Government and the Bank of Italy, that would rescue all the
Catholic banks indiscriminately, preserving both their moral and
their financial autonomy.
The plan outlined by Menichella, backed by the Bank of Italy
and the Ministry of Finance (also by the new minister Antonio
Mosconi) envisaged, instead, a selective intervention: to reorganize
the less compromised banks through an institution formed among
those “in good or fair shape”, and to let the damaged banks die.23
A long-running dispute began that reached had a first turning
point at the end of 1928. The Istituto Centrale di Credito was finally
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with Volpi on how public authorities would intervene and on the inappropriateness of
allowing the men of the federated banks to deal with the situation (ASBI, Direttorio
Menichella, cart. 102, fasc. 2, pp. 15-21, Banche cattoliche, Premessa sulla situazione delle
banche cattoliche, 15 maggio 1928).
21 The data communicated by the Banking Federation “would deserve to be treated
with extreme caution because experience shows that confessions of this nature, when
they come from men directly or indirectly linked to the situations created, turn out to
be, even if made in the most blatant good faith, overcome and aggravated by the defini-
tive findings” (ASBI, Direttorio Menichella, cart 102, fasc 2, p. 2, lettera a Bonaldo
Stringher, 12 maggio 1928).
22 F. Dandolo and F. Sbrana, “Le trasformazioni del settore bancario italiano fra le due
guerre”, in P. Barucci, S. Misiani, and M. Mosca (eds.), La cultura economica tra le due
guerre, Milan, 2015, pp. 122-124. See also F. Dandolo, “Le banche dall’autocrazia al con-
trollo politico (1915-1945), in L. Conte (ed.), Le Banche e l’Italia. Crescita economica e società
civile 1861-2011, Rome, 2011, pp. 103-137.
23 The damaged banks, Menichella explained, “must not participate in the establishment
of the institution”; otherwise their administrators, depositors and shareholders would
have thought they were entitled to be rescued by the State (ASBI, Direttorio Menichella,
cart. 102, fasc. 2, pp. 27-30, Osservazioni sul progetto di Statuto dell’Istituto centrale delle
banche cattoliche, 14 giugno 1928).
established, thanks above all to the intervention of the Holy See and
the intermediation of Pietro Tacchi Venturi, just as the negotiations
for the Concordat between Italy and the Vatican were about to con-
clude. Contrary to Menichella’s hopes, the already badly damaged
banks contributed to subscribing the 15 million lire of share capital,24
and the long-serving managing director of Banca Cattolica Vicentina
and key person in the whole affair, Nicola Bevilacqua, was ap-
pointed its president,25 assisted by others Federation men, including
Mario Pettoello.26 However, in order to operate the Istituto Centrale
di Credito needed the financial support of the Bank of Italy, which
in 1929 continued to keep a tight hold on the purse strings, display-
ing indifference to the first collapses of Catholic banks.27 The stale-
mate finally ended between April and May 1930, when Senator
Stefano Cavazzoni accepted the presidency of the Istituto Centrale
di Credito at the direct invitation of the Head of Government.28 The
first loan of 50 million lire was disbursed by the Bank of Italy on 3
April 1930; that sum would soon prove insufficient for the reorga-
nization of banks whose real situation was much more compromised
than had been reported by the now former president Bevilacqua.29
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24 The list of the banks (26 in total) to which 15 million lire of existing capital can be as-
cribed shows that all Catholic banks of Veneto were all present, including the already
severely damaged Credito Veneto, Credito Polesano and Banca della Venezia Giulia
(ASBI, Direttorio Introna, cart. 28, fasc. 1, sfasc. 7, pp. 75-77, lettera di Nicola Bevilacqua,
president dell’Istituto Centrale – organo federale delle banche cattoliche – a Bonaldo
Stringher, 28 giugno 1929).
25 For a list of his management positions, see Table 1. In addition, Bevilacqua was a
member of the board of the Italian Banking Federation and secretary of Credito
Nazionale, as well as a member of the board of Banco di Roma.
26 For a list of his management positions, see Table 1. He was also on the board of au-
ditors of Credito Nazionale.
27 At that time, Società Bancaria Marchigiana, Piccolo Credito di Cuneo and Credit Val-
dotain failed.
28 Stefano Cavazzoni had left the Partito Popolare Italiano to found, together with P.
Mattei Gentili, A. Carapelle, G. Grosoli and F. Mauro, the “National Center”, a Catholic
group sympathizing with fascism. (F. Malgeri, “Stefano Cavazzoni”, in Istituto dell’en-
ciclopedia italiana (ed.), Dizionario biografico degli italiani, XXIII, Rome, 1979, pp. 62-66).
29 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. 7499, fasc. 1, pp. 438-440, lettera del
Governatore della Banca d’Italia all’Istituto Centrale di Credito, 3 aprile 1930. Between
When Mussolini, in his address of 18 December 1930 to the Sen-
ate on the economic policy of the regime, spoke of the ruins left by
religion-based banks, guilty of having “vaporized one billion lire of
the poor people,”30 he was probably reading the list of Catholic credit
institutions in financial trouble since 1927: 166 (largely rural banks
with 32.2 million lire deposits)31 had been put into liquidation, 19
(with 103.7 million lire of deposits)32 had started bankruptcy proce-
dures, 19 (with 1,057 million lire of deposits) were in compositions
with creditors, and 23 (1,723 million lire of deposits) had been res-
cued by state intervention.33
Given the large number of institutions involved (about fifty), the
field of the present investigation was limited to the Catholic banks
of Veneto,34 which accounted for a significant portion of the total de-
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December 1930 and January 1931, two other loans were granted for a total of 40 million
lire (ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. 7499, fasc. 1, pp. 223-225, lettera di
Stefano Cavazzoni al Governatore della Banca d’Italia, 14 aprile 1931).
30 Rossini, Le banche cattoliche, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
31 On the decline of the cooperative credit institutions during the period under consid-
eration, see A. Leonardi, “Italian credit cooperatives from 1918 to 1945”, The Journal of
European Economic History, no. 2, 2012, pp. 51-86. See also P. Cafaro, La solidarietà effi-
ciente. Storia e prospettive del credito cooperativo in Italia (1883-2000), Rome-Bari, 2001.
32 Among these there was Credito Regionale Ligure, which had about 50 million lire of
deposits.
33 This list was requested of Niccolò Introna by Ettore Rosboch in order to “complete
an urgent report requested by the Head of Government” (ASBI, Direttorio Introna, cart.
28, fasc. 1, sfasc. 2, p. 4, lettera di Ettore Rosboch a Niccolò Introna, 12 dicembre 1930).
Although they are simply labeled as collapsed Catholic credit institutions, the numbers
reported by A. De’ Stefani, Baraonda bancaria, Roma, 1960, pp. 496-497, are consistent
with those cited here: 20 in 1926, 22 in 1927, 22 in 1928, 10 in the first half of 1929; with
a total volume of deposits of over one billion lire.
34 The Catholic banks of Veneto include those based in Friuli and Venezia Giulia, a cir-
cumscribed but highly significant geographical area, whose socio-economic structure
at the beginning of the twentieth century was still poised between a well-established
agricultural sector and strong impulses coming from the industrial sector (for instance,
the Marghera industrial pole and the Venetian group formed by Gaggia, Volpi di Mis-
urata and Cini). On this topic: G. Zalin, Dalla bottega alla fabbrica. La fenomenologia in-
dustriale nelle province venete tra ‘500 e ‘900, Venice, 1987; G. Zalin, ”Il Veneto e il Friuli
da economie agricolo-tradizionali all’industrializzazione diffusa (1866-2001). Riflessioni
tematiche”, Annali della Fondazione Mariano Rumor, 2 (2007), pp. 25-70; G. Roverato,
L’industria nel Veneto. Storia economica di un “caso” regionale, Padua, 1996; A. Cafarelli,
La terra avara. Assetti fondiari e forme di conduzione agraria nella Bassa friulana (1866-1914),
posits raised (with over 425 million) and whose leaders were pow-
erful within in the national federation.
In total, there were 10 banks involved in various ways in the fi-
nancial trouble and in the rescue operations. Nine were members of
the Italian Banking Federation either directly (Banca Cattolica Vi-
centina, Credito Veneto, Banca Cattolica di Udine, Banca della
Venezia Giulia, Credito Polesano, Banca Cadorina and Banca Cat-
tolica Atestina) or indirectly (Banca Feltrina and Banca Provinciale
di Belluno), and one was independent (Banca Cattolica San Liberale
di Treviso). The study was conducted on documents kept at the Bank
of Italy’s Historical Archives35 and the Intesa-Sanpaolo Historical
Archive.36
3. The anatomy of failure
De Rosa’s thesis concerning a strategy of the regime to weaken
the system of Catholic banks is certainly plausible. Nevertheless, if
the events are analysed from the economic point of view, both macro
and micro, research on the origins of the crisis leads us elsewhere. It
can be argued that Fascism took advantage of the opportunity to
consolidate its power: sorting out the problems of banks so deeply
rooted in the territory and closely tied to the Catholic environment
of Veneto allowed it to achieve exceptional “political as well as eco-
nomic” results.37
On a macro-economic level, the policy of the regime for the de-
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Venice, 1999; F. Bof, Le casse rurali nella Marca trevigiana tra ‘800 e ‘900. Alle origini della
cooperazione cattolica di credito nelle campagne venete, Treviso, 1992; F. Bof, Credito e servizi
all’agricoltura nelle campagne veneto-friulane tra Otto e Novecento, Udine, 2007.
35 In addition to the documents of a single bank present in ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende
di credito, the papers in ASBI, Direttorio Stringher, Introna and Menichella were also
consulted.
36 In particular, the documents in the Banca Cattolica del Veneto papers were consulted
(P. Chiapponi and C. Guizzi, La Banca cattolica del Veneto e il suo patrimonio archivistico,
Turin, 2007).
37 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. N. 7499, fasc. 1, p. 27, Promemoria
Cavazzoni, febbraio 1935.
fense of the lira and of national savings undoubtedly formed the
backdrop against which the events unfolded, and in this sense the
origins of this crisis might at first sight be traced to the deflationary
effects of “quota 90”.38 In fact, however, the documents tell us that
the difficulties that later gave rise to financial troubles went back to
the first half of the 1920s, and so the “stabilization” of the lira can
only be considered a factor that aggravated the situation of the
“Veneto group”. Yet, there is one aspect of the monetary measures
of 1926-27 that can be directly connected to the episode and, in par-
ticular, to the emergence of the state of instability that gripped those
banks. We are referring here to the two decrees of September and
November 1926, which restricted the freedom of action of credit in-
stitutions, obliging them to provide financial statements and other
periodic accounting information to the Bank of Italy, which was
granted the powers of control and inspection over the banking sys-
tem. Together with the introduction of a capital/deposit ratio (at
least 1 to 20) and a ceiling on credit granted to the same customer
(one fifth of the capital, which could be exceeded only with the au-
thorization of the Bank of Italy),39 these measures induced many
banks to think about the strategies with which to adapt to the new
rules. It is also important to consider the altered economic context,
which had reduced the self-financing capacity of companies, whose
debtor positions towards the banking system were becoming more
and more consolidated until they finally became immobilized. Nor
should we forget the complications created by the arrival in Italy of
the effects of the Great Depression,40 something that was clear to the
protagonists at the time.
These observations allow us to frame the events regarding the
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38 J.C. Martinez Oliva, “The Stabilization of the Italian Lira and the ‘quota novanta’”,
The Journal of European Economic History, no. 1, 2006, pp. 11-36.
39 F. Belli, “Le leggi bancarie del 1926 e del 1936-1938”, in Banca e industria fra le due
guerre. Ricerca promossa dal Banco di Roma in occasione del suo primo centenario, II, Le riforme
istituzionali e il pensiero giuridico, Bologna, 1981, pp. 207-208.
40 L. De Rosa, “The Consequences of the Crisis of 1929 on the Italian Banking System”,
The Journal of European Economic History, no. 2, 2007, pp. 225-249.
Catholic banks in a dual perspective. The first, domestic, leads us to
consider the impact, far from neutral, of the construction of the cor-
porative state on the economic system,41 particularly in the credit
sector. The second, of a comparative kind, lets us place the events
within the broader setting of the banking crises that took place in-
ternationally between the world wars. The two perspectives are
linked insofar as the rationalizing action of the Fascist State was,
above all in the banking sector, in line “with choices made outside
of Italy.”42
Concerning the first point, in view of the important social func-
tion that Fascism attributed to savings, the crisis of Catholic banks
constituted a first test for the affirmation of corporativism in the
banking sector. In this case we can already see, on the one hand, the
loss of autonomy for the banks and their administrators (bank au-
tocracy), and on the other, the emergence of the technocratic elite
(represented in this specific case by Menichella) on which Mussolini
relied in the 1930s to manage the new phase of public intervention.
Moreover, as will be shown below, the Catholic banks’ operations
had already exposed the fragility of a redundant banking system
which, at the local level, thanks to the post-war credit euphoria,43
pursued investment strategies similar to those of large banks: stock
market speculation and excessive concentration of risks towards a
few companies in which savers’ deposits were immobilized.
Regarding the second point, the idea that international banking
crises in the interwar years were almost everywhere closely linked
to deflationary policies led J. Jonker and J. L. van Zenden to identify
two major waves of bankruptcy. The first hit the so-called neutral
countries, including Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Nor-
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41 See the observations by S. Cassese, Lo Stato fascista, Bologna, 2010, p. 140.
42 Cassese, Lo Stato, op. cit., p. 22. For a comparison of the evolution of the main inter-
national banking systems between the two wars, see N. Tridente, La concentrazione ban-
caria dalla prima guerra mondiale ai giorni nostri, Bari 1955.
43 Tridente, La concentrazione bancaria, pp. 17, 87-95; G. Toniolo, “Italian banking”, in
C.H. Feinstein (ed.), Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe Between the Wars, Oxford,
1995, pp. 300-302.
way, in the first half of the 1920s, whereas the second involved such
countries as France, Belgium, Austria, Germany and Italy, which, by
taking deflationary and stabilizing measures in the second half of
the 1920s, were overwhelmed by the crisis only in the following
decade. However, given that not all the deflationary shocks gener-
ated banking crises (in the UK, for example), the two authors argue
that the latter depended on the increase in the fragility of the bank-
ing system, linked in its turn to the huge war-related and post-war
financial expansion (from 1913 onwards). Banks adopted two strate-
gies to defend themselves against inflation: to convert loans into
shares and/or to quickly and uncontrollably increase lending. Either
way, they became more vulnerable to the subsequent deflationary
waves.44 The case of Italy’s Catholic banks fits well with this ap-
proach, since deflation did nothing but lay bare the fragility created
during the previous expansion.
On the microeconomic level, the focus of the following pages, it
is necessary to investigate more thoroughly the real situation of
Catholic credit institutions involved in financial troubles. In this re-
gard, three elements appear hitherto to have been underestimated:
a) the real economic and financial situation of the Veneto banks; b)
the interconnections and financial and organizational interdepen-
dencies (in terms of individuals), which had in fact led to the cre-
ation of a real group; and c) the role and responsibilities of the top
management of Banca Cattolica Vicentina.
a) Veneto banks’ real economic and financial situation
According to G. De Rosa, at the beginning of the 1920s, “the
Catholic banking structure was still solid,” compromised only by its
links with Banco di Roma through Credito Nazionale.45 To be sure,
those links were not minor, but the state of instability in which the
Catholic banks of Veneto found themselves cannot be ascribed ex-
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44 J. Jonker and J. van Zenden, Method in the Madness? Banking Crises between the Wars,
an International Comparison, in Feinstein (ed.), Banking, Currency, pp. 77-93.
45 De Rosa, La Banca cattolica, op. cit., p. 121.
clusively to them. A first observation concerns the banks’ annual fi-
nancial statements approved by their shareholders’ meetings, which
in many cases, for several years, depicted financial and operating
conditions markedly different from how things really stood. When
the first mergers were carried out in the second half of 1930 with the
creation of Banca Cattolica del Veneto46 and the request for an ar-
rangement with creditors for the three troubled institutions (Credito
Veneto, Credito Polesano and Banca della Venezia Giulia), it
emerged that all the federated Catholic banks of Veneto had hidden
much greater losses than those initially reported, enough to wipe
out their capital.47 It was thereupon decided to extend the program
of accommodation of the Catholic banks of Veneto to include Banca
Cattolica San Liberale of Treviso, which had not only stayed out of
the Banking Federation but had openly declared that it wanted to
remain independent of the nascent Banca Cattolica del Veneto. Pres-
sure was brought to bear on the leaders of the Treviso bank (Secondo
Piovesan and Matteo Passi) by Niccolò Introna and Ettore Rosboch,
the Undersecretary for Finance, who made it clear to them that nei-
ther the Bank of Italy nor the Government would intervene in favor
of Banca Cattolica San Liberale if it would not help stave off the
bankruptcy of the three troubled banks, but also gave Piovesan and
Passi assurances that the leadership of the new Banca Cattolica del
Veneto would be entrusted to San Liberale men.48 Unlike the other
banks, San Liberale could present itself for merger into Banca Cat-
tolica del Veneto with a positive net worth of 3.6 million lire.
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46 Banca Cattolica del Veneto was born on 16 October 1930 from the merger of Banca
Cattolica di Udine, Banca Cattolica Atestina and Banca Cadorina into Banca Cattolica
Vicentina. The ministerial decree of 11 August 1930, declaring “the planned merger to
be of public interest,” also envisaged the merger of the following institutions: Credito
Veneto, Credito Polesano, Banca della Venezia Giulia, Banca Provinciale di Belluno,
Banca Feltrina, Banca Popolare Capodistriana (ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito,
pratt. N. 1464, fasc. 1, p. 123).
47 Banca Cattolica del Veneto was born with a total capital shortfall of approximately
65 million lire.
48 ASI, Bav, Bcv, Fondo AD, Serie Secondo Piovesan, Corrispondenza, b. 2, fasc. 17,
Promemoria di Secondo Piovesan, 19 novembre 1930.
As to the origin of these losses, hidden in various asset items of
the balance sheet, they largely derived from loans to agricultural, in-
dustrial or banking companies, in most cases granted jointly with
the other banks of the Veneto “group”.
A first remark we can make regards the absolutely non-contin-
gent nature of the crisis of Veneto’s Catholic banks. In the years im-
mediately after the First World War, these banks, “having abundant
resources and lured by the prospect of easy earnings,” set about
looking for opportunities for industrial lending, creating several
companies “but without specific knowledge about their prospects
for development.”49 For many of these companies, the banks as-
sumed the dual role of shareholder (sometimes controller) and fi-
nancier. Their concentration on “industrial lending,” though begun
with the intention of creating work for the local population, diverted
them from their original objectives: “first of all, to collect small sav-
ings and preserve them in a safe and fruitful way, as well as to ap-
propriately meet the needs of agriculture and industry.”50
Examination of the documentation revealed the causes of the huge
losses and the “accounting artifices” which the administrators had
used to hide them. In summary, it would not be unfair to say that a
good part of the past-due loans of the Catholic banks of Veneto had
been made to a number of companies that had been poorly managed
at least from the first half of the 1920s and with which there were
“interlocking interests.”51 Beginning in the same period, these banks
suffered huge losses on stock-exchange transactions. The “main
cause of the financial troubles” lay in the “conduct of the adminis-
trators,” defined as “lieutenants of the top management of Catholic
banks”. They were guilty of having negligently endorsed huge in-
vestments “at a loss to the banks and industries of the group”; of
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49 ASI, Bav, Bcv, Fondo Archivi aggregati, serie Credito Veneto, b. 14, Concordato – Re-
lazione del commissario parte tecnica – attivo, pp. 441-442.
50 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. 8566, fasc. 1, pp. 172-173, lettera del
Commissario giudiziale del Credito Polesano al Giudice delegato del Tribunale di
Rovigo, 4 January 1931.
51 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. N. 7935, fasc. 1, pp. 112-113.
having aggravated losses “with stock-exchange transactions” and
with “poor selection of credit lines”; of having prepared and ap-
proved “systematically from 1923 onwards false financial state-
ments”, with the aim of artificially extending the life of the banks.52
Thus, most of their annual financial statements, officially closed in
profit, would have recorded significant losses. In general, many asset
items were inflated. Furthermore, securities, consisting for a “large
nominal amount of industrial and banking securities of companies
created and controlled” by the same banks, had always been
recorded “above the nominal value”, even though the banks were
aware of the precarious, if not disastrous, conditions of many of
these companies.
b) Financial and organizational interconnections and interdependencies
An aspect that makes the case of Catholic banks extremely com-
plex but also points to an important key to understanding and in-
terpreting the crisis concerns the strong links between banks. It was
a veritable “tangle of unclear relations” that the banks of Veneto had
with each other and with “the most varied (and defunct) financial,
agricultural, industrial, etc. companies” of the region.53 These ties
were long-standing and could affect both the ownership structure
and the composition of the boards of directors of banks and compa-
nies. In some cases, the interference dated back to when the bank
was founded, as in the case of Credito Veneto and Banca della
Venezia Giulia, both born in 1919 as a direct initiative of Credito
Nazionale and other Catholic banks of Veneto, in particular Vi-
centina, whose board members (Nicola Bevilacqua and Alessandro
Zileri) were also at the top of the Italian Banking Federation.
During the 1920s, the interweaving of the Catholic banks of
THE ANATOMY OF A BANK CRISIS. THE CASE OF THE CATHOLIC BANKS OF THE VENETO REGION
IN THE LATE 1920S
57JEEH • 3/2018
52 ASI, BAV, BCV, AD, RIS 1, Sentenza di omologazione del concordato preventivo pro-
posto dalla Banca della Venezia Giulia in Trieste, January 1932, pp. 11-12.
53 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. N. 7499, fasc. 1, p. 223, lettera del pres-
idente dell’Istituto centrale di Credito al Governatore della Banca d’Italia, 14 aprile
1931.
Veneto gained pace and grew more complicated, ending up by form-
ing a real group. In this regard, the court-appointed administrator of
the arrangement with creditors of Credito Polesano had underlined
the importance of “the so-called interferences and intimate relation-
ships” which created an extremely strong chain between groups of
credit institutions and which manifested themselves markedly in
Veneto, “to the point of forming almost a single body with represen-
tatives and organs in all the provinces.” This “banking phenomenon”
was accompanied by another development that tended to complicate
the situation further: the creation of institutions (companies limited
by shares) that “had the main task, through capital absorption of the
banks,” of “rectifying the compromised capital positions, but main-
taining industrial or speculative assets ” which it would have been
better to abandon.54 Various examples serve to illustrate this, but
three in particular shed important light on the banks’ instability: Sin-
dacato Agricolo Industriale Veneto, Consorzio Agricolo Industriale
Veneto and Unione Economica delle Tre Venezie.
Sindacato Agricolo Industriale Veneto was established in Padua
in 1919 at the initiative of Credito Veneto (with the participation of
Polesano, Banca Cattolica Vicentina and Banca della Venezia
Giulia).55 Its stated purpose was to “develop the banking organiza-
tion through other organizations that would operate in the agricul-
tural, commercial and industrial fields.” Through it, the banks of the
Veneto group were involved in a vast program to support companies
active “in the sale of fertilizers, seeds, agricultural machinery” or in
“renting, buying and selling land.”56 It operated both through share-
holdings and through classic financing operations to companies
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54 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. 8566, fasc. 1, pp. 174-175, lettera del
Commissario giudiziale del Credito Polesano al Giudice delegato del Tribunale di
Rovigo, 4 gennaio 1931.
55 Its initial capital of 1 million was then raised to 10 million lire and was subscribed as
follows: 4.78 million by Credito Veneto, 2.67 million by Banca Vicentina, 1.28 million
by Credito Polesano, 0.75 million by Banca della Venezia Giulia, and 0.5 million by So-
cietà agraria italiana di Bologna.
56 ASI, Bav, Bcv, Fondo Archivi aggregati, serie Credito Veneto, b. 14, Concordato – Re-
lazione del commissario parte tecnica – attivo, pp. 446-448.
such as Fabbrica Concimi Pordenone, Fabbrica Concimi Cita, Società
Veneta Legnami Bisi, Industrie Riunite Venete, Frutteti Cogo and
Sindacato Agricolo Trevigiano.57
Consorzio Agricolo Industriale Veneto was founded in Rovigo
at the end of 1923, when the exposures of Credito Polesano to the
above-mentioned companies had become unsustainable. In concert
with the main Catholic banks of Veneto, Banca Trentina, Cattolica
Veronese and Sindacato Agricolo Industriale, it was decided to cre-
ate a consortium in which to concentrate all the companies, with the
dual objective of “reducing Credito Polesano’s financial burden”
and “better coordinating the economic and financial life of industrial
companies” preparatory to their subsequent divestment.58 Consorzio
Agricolo Industriale Veneto also served to concentrate “all the
debtor positions of all individual companies towards the Polesano
and other Catholic banks of the Veneto.”
The third example of interconnections among the Catholic banks
of Veneto comes precisely from Unione Economica delle Venezie,
which perhaps best illustrates the network of cross-shareholdings
(Figure 1). It was created in 1923 at the initiative of Banca Cattolica
Vicentina (32%), Credito Veneto (16%), Banca Cattolica di Udine
(16%), Credito Polesano (16%) and Banca Trentina (16%), as a finan-
cial entity “intended to concentrate all the Catholic banks of the
Veneto through acquisition of the majority of the corresponding share
capital.” According to 1927 financial statements, Unione Economica
delle Tre Venezie owned the majority of the share capital of the main
Catholic banks of Veneto, which in turn owned the totality of its cap-
ital. Considering that even the Bank of Italy could not explain “how
and with what means” Unione had become the owner of these
banks,59, we can deem it to have been, in every respect, a mere vehicle
for clearing transactions between the banks of the group.
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57 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. 8566, fasc. 1, pp. 192-193, Relazione di
Paolo Tosetti, consulente tecnico del Commissario giudiziale del Credito Polesano, 5
dicembre 1930.
58 ASI, Bav, Bcv, Fondo Archivi aggregati, serie Credito Veneto, b. 14, Concordato – Re-
lazione del commissario parte tecnica – attivo, pp. 441-443.
59 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. N. 8464, fasc. 1, p. 151.
On the other hand, various elements support the idea that the
overall management of the Catholic banks of Veneto had single di-
rection, which, also due to the above-mentioned cross-sharehold-
ings, was headed by Banca Cattolica Vicentina and Credito Veneto.
The Veneto banks “were not only organized according to the same
stance, but were administered and directed by people who, with dif-
ferent offices,” always appeared in the same institutions (Table 1).
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FIGURE 1
Cross-shareholdings between Catholic banks of Veneto (1928)
Source: ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. 8464, fasc. 1, pp. 48-49, 121, 151-157.
TABLE 1




Nicola Bevilacqua B.C. Vicentina -Unione Ec. Tre Ven. Cr. Veneto B. Cadorina
Carlo Belloni Sind. A.I.V. C. Polesano C. Veneto
Mario Pettoello B.V. Giulia
B.C. Udine - C. Veneto
- S.A.I.V - Unione Ec.
Tre Ven.
Arturo Miani B.C. Udine C. Veneto - Unione Ec.Tre Ven.
Virginio Bontadini C. Veneto S.A.I.V. - Unione Ec.Tre Ven.
Alessandro Zileri B.C. Vicentina C. Veneto - S.A.I.V. -Unione Ec. Tre Ven.
C) The role and responsibility of Banca Cattolica Vicentina
The complicated intertwining of all the banks, with the excep-
tion of San Liberale, still leaves some doubts as to the real responsi-
bility of Banca Cattolica Vicentina and therefore about the actual
origin of those troubles. As Vicentina’s leaders were at the head of
the failed banks, then perhaps there was truth to their claim that the
defunct Catholic banks of Vicenza and Udine had been put in due
time in a privileged position, offloading heavy charges and losses
on other unstable banks to be able to present themselves in good
shape during the merger negotiations. Thus, if the three banks under
the arrangement procedures had failed, their creditors could have
raised problems by calling on the defunct Catholic banks in Vicenza
and Udine to answer for the aforementioned dumping and seriously
embarrassing the new bank.60 There was more than rumors to all
this. What is more, contrary to what had been affirmed at first
(November 1930) and was “desirable for the tranquility of life of the
new company,” Banca Cattolica del Veneto was obliged to intervene
in the composition with creditors of the three failed banks with
which there was “a cumulation of interference” and “interlocking
positions.”61
4. Conclusion
In the case of Catholic banks of Veneto, the failure of the three
institutions did not result in widespread panic, which would prob-
ably have caused the collapse of all the Catholic banks of Veneto.
Yet, a loss of confidence in a banking system dominated by local in-
stitutions ensued due to the losses of at least 60 percent of deposits
incurred by savers belonging largely to the agricultural class, as well
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60 ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. N. 7935, fasc. 1, pp. 22-23, Credito
Veneto, Riservata del direttore della sede di Padova al Governatore, 2 dicembre 1930.
61 ASI, BCV, AD, SP/Corr. 3, fasc. 5 1934, Promemoria per il presidente dell’Istituto cen-
trale di Credito, 24 novembre 1934, p. 2.
as to long and uncertain recovery times.62 Given the general illiquid-
ity of the assets of all the institutions involved, further withdrawals
would certainly have led to a generalized collapse.
As the correspondence between the Bank of Italy’s local branch
managers and its directors in Rome show, the central bank acted
with the utmost caution to avoid drawing the public’s attention to
individual banks and thereby increasing their difficulties.63 How-
ever, if it is true, as Toniolo writes, that the “delaying techniques to
resist political pressure and, above all, the need to let individual local
situations mature,” led to appreciable results, it is also true that the
Bank of Italy’s temporizing strategy, aggravated by the lack of a
strong position on the part of the Government, probably had a cost.
Contrary to the principles that had guided the intervention plan en-
dorsed by the Bank of Italy and the Government, which was to be
selective and avoid omnibus measures, the first tranche of 50 million
lire granted to the Istituto Centrale di Credito (April 1930, manage-
ment under Bevilacqua),64 which transferred it to Banca Cattolica Vi-
centina, was largely used to rescue the three endangered banks, first
of all Credito Veneto.65 This also confirms the intention of the old
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62 Another further observation is called for. If restoration of the percentage in cash was
certain (25 per cent for Credito Veneto and Banca della Venezia Giulia, 28 per cent for
Credito Polesano), the same cannot be said for the part reimbursed by the transfer of
“B” shares of Banca Cattolica del Veneto, whose value (to be verified) depended on the
timing and results of the disinvestment operations.
63 Thus, for example, the director of the Padua branch of the Bank of Italy, regarding a
possible inspection, asked that “in order not to impress the public, it would perhaps
be opportune for it to be preceded by a pro-forma visit to some other city bank of little
importance, in order not to waste a lot of time and more than anything else to give the
impression to the citizenry that the measure does not only concern Credito
Veneto”(ASBI, Vigilance, pratt. N. 7935, fasc 1, p. 467, lettera del direttore della sede di
Padova al direttore generale, 3 gennaio 1928).
64 Bevilacqua himself, as the president of the Istituto Centrale di Credito, in the letter to
the Governor of the Bank of Italy applying for a loan of 50 million lire, specified that
the Institute was born “with the purpose of coming to the aid of the Catholic banks de-
serving support,” giving the strongest assurances that the sum would be sufficient and
that no other requests were forthcoming (ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt.
N. 7499, fasc. 1, pp. 438- 439).
65 Soon after the new president of the Istituto Centrale di Credito, Stefano Cavazzoni,
leaders of the Veneto group (Bevilacqua) not to wash its dirty laun-
dry in public. In other words, they wanted to resolve the complex
and delicate situation of the banks belonging to Unione Economica
delle Tre Venezie and the Istituto Centrale di Credito without outside
interference but with the financial help of the State.66 After all,
Menichella was not mistaken when, in 1928, commenting on the
draft statute of the Istituto Centrale di Credito, he had highlighted
the desire of the Federation’s top management (first of all Bevilac-
qua) to “put in place a situation of ties between the various banks,
which represented a veiled form of merging of the various assets”,
thus implementing “the confusion of the good banks with the bad
banks” so as to make “any provision aimed at clearing the ground
from the bankrupt banks impossible or seriously dangerous.”67 In
fact, if it was not for the checks made by the new administrators of
the Istituto Centrale di Credito, Cavazzoni and Mauro, Banca Cat-
tolica del Veneto, strengthened by the ministerial decree of 10 Au-
gust 1930, would have proceeded with the already widely
publicized merger of Credito Veneto, Credito Polesano and Banca
della Venezia Giulia. The modus operandi of the Catholic banks sug-
gests the expression “bank delinquency”, used at the time to de-
scribe the “criminal activities that the managers of the credit
institutions” carried out at the expense of the unaware masses of de-
positors.68 In the specific case, the damage was substantial and could
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told the Governor of the Bank of Italy, that “most of the available funds had been pro-
vided with the criterion of responding to the immediate needs of the endangered banks,
i.e. the worse ones” (ASBI, Vigilanza sulle aziende di credito, pratt. N. 7499, fasc. 1, p.
223, lettera di Stefano Cavazzoni al governatore della Banca d’Italia, 14 aprile 1931).
66 There is a trace of this right at the beginning of the events, in 1928, when the president
of the Banking Federation, soliciting the support of the Bank of Italy for the project of
accommodation of Catholic banks, wrote to the Minister of Finance, requesting, among
other things, that their work not be hindered with “any inspection or the like, which at
such a delicate time, and when preparing a general recovery,” could shake the position
of some bank and hurt “the general standing of the Federation as well as public credit
in some regions»(ASBI, Direttorio Introna, cart. 29, fasc. 1, sfasc. 2, p. 49).
67 ASBI, Direttorio Menichella, cart. 102, fasc. 2, p. 27, Osservazioni sul progetto di
Statuto dell’Istituto Centrale delle Banche cattoliche, 14 giugno1928.
68 R. Santoro, La difesa del risparmio, Milan, Rome, Naples, 1927, pp. 80-81.
be immediately estimated at around 120 million lire for only the
three banks under the arrangement procedure. Considering that the
rumors that the three endangered institutions were in deep water
had been circulating since 1927 and at times had triggered substan-
tial withdrawals of deposits, two conclusions can be drawn. The first
concerns the losses suffered by savers (and more generally by unse-
cured creditors), which had undoubtedly grown in the following
three years as the numerous illiquid assets and past-due loans of
these banks continued to produce negative effects on their income
statements. The second conclusion regards the moral and economic
responsibilities of those who had directly (the Federation’s top man-
agers) or indirectly (the authorities) “kept the non-viable organisms
alive.” Bearing in mind that in the period 1927-30 the deposits of
these three banks remained almost stable, it seems clear that, as
Menichella had warned, there were “disparities in treatment” be-
tween those who had withdrawn their savings at the first signs of
the storm and those who deposited them later, “encouraged by the
amazing declarations”, first, about the birth of the Istituto Centrale
di Credito and, then, about the merger into Banca Cattolica del
Veneto.69
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69 The reference is always to the Menichella’s observations concerning the project of the
central credit institutions of Catholics banks (ASBI, Direttorio Menichella, cart. 102,
fasc. 2, p. 28, Osservazioni sul progetto).
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